I N T RO D U C T I O N
In the present phase of world economic development, social policy activities traditionally analysed and undertaken within one country now take on a supranational and transnational character. This is for several reasons. Economic competition between countries could lead to the The methodology of the study is to analyse the social policy prescriptions offered by the global actors to the four countries in our study (Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Ukraine) and to interview global agency personnel and recipient government ministers. These prescriptions are compared with actual policy decisions made by the countries concerned. The emphasis in this article is on the character of the social policy advice at a general level and in the field of income maintenance. At a later stage, we hope to report how much impact this advice has had on actual policy making.
G L O B A L AC T O R S A N D P O S T-C O M M U N I S M ; I N I T I A L F I N D I N G S O F P I L O T S T U DY
An initial pilot study of the role of supranational and global agencies in shaping social policy since 1989 in Eastern Europe (Deacon, 1994) was based on a survey of the stated objectives and actual practice of the ILO, the EC and the IMF. An initial review of World Bank thinking and practice was also included. It was concluded that: competition between different fractions of global capitalism (e.g., EU for Europe and IMF for USA) (vii) Some parts of CEE/CIS are more favoured by all agencies than others (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Czech, Slovak republics).
More generally, on the basis of the initial investigation, it was provisionally concluded that:
It is evident that a major ideological struggle is taking place over the shape and content of the social security and income maintenance aspects of social policy in the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. The struggle over what is to replace the social guarantees of forced but available employment for all between a USA style individualist social policy, a European style conservative or social market economy style social policy (with which social democracy is merging), and a futuristic citizenship entitlement to guaranteed income, is being articulated and fought every bit as much at the level of the supranational agencies as it is being played out within the confines of intra-state politics. (Deacon, 1994) Nothing from our further research would lead us to modify this broad conclusion. It is necessary, however, to refine slightly the ways in which, in the previous article, we characterised the policy prescriptions of the ILO and IMF. In terms of the IMF, the thrust of the earlier argument was to show how public expenditure cuts associated with the conditions attached to IMF lending lead to significant reductions in, for example, entitlement to unemployment benefit. What lay hidden from view was the unpublished advice offered by the Fund to governments in this field. Of particular significance in this advice (Tanzi, 1991 (Tanzi, , 1993 , is the emphasis put by leading fiscal policy experts in the Fund on self-targeted workfare strategies as an alternative, either to lengthy unemployment insurance entitlements, or means-tested social assistance entitlements.
Subsequent analysis of ILO policy for the region suggests that we previously gave undue emphasis to the citizens' income idea, promulgated by key figures in the Central and Eastern European Team of the ILO based in Budapest (Standing, 1991, Standing and Tokman, 1991) and too little attention to the more conservative concerns of the Geneva office, shared by some within the CEET unit (Cichon, 1994) . This other wing of the ILO is concerned to (re)establish in the region the tradition of Bismarkian insurance backed up by universal benefits and means-tested social assistance. These modifications to the earlier work only serve to underscore the conclusion we wish to draw in this article that there is a heated intra-agency as well as inter-agency debate in progress as to the best prescriptions for the future of social policy in general and income maintenance in particular.
E U RO P E A N B A S E D AC T O R S
In this section we review our initial analysis of the general social policy prescriptions of the EU, the COE and the OECD, and describe and evaluate their instruments which may be used to influence the development of post-communist social policy.
Social Policy assumptions of European actors
The EU and OECD were both conceived as organisations concerned to coordinate and regulate economic interaction between member states. Statements from the European Commission from the beginning of the 1980s have emphasised the need for a social dimension to economic integration. Social objectives, they stressed, should not be sacrificed on the altar of economic efficiency; redistributive activity should be retained in the face of economic recession. More alarmist notes emanated initially from the OECD who during the same period stressed the need to contain welfare state expenditure which, they claimed, was accelerating out of control in some member states. The rapporteurs' summary of an OECD conference in 1980 on 'The Crisis of Welfare' ended with the definitive statement that social policy in many countries creates obstacles to growth.
More recently there has been something of a convergence of the two agencies' social policy orientations. In the case of the EU, attention has been increasingly focused on the possible threats to competitiveness implied by the European welfare model. Meanwhile, a challenge to the traditionally liberal macro-economic perspectives of the OECD has begun to emerge, mainly from within with the Directorate of Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, in a new orientation on social policy which recognises the economic benefits of expanded income support programmes. Indeed, at an OECD meeting of ministers of social policy in December 1992, it was agreed that social expenditures are important investments and that restriction would be counterproductive if the objectives of social policy were sacrificed. The main features of the approach to social policy as expressed by the EU and the OECD, compared with that of the COE, are shown in Table 1 .
The social policy interest of the COE has been more long-standing than that of either the European Union or the OECD, and comes more from a human rights tradition than from a market perspective. The European 
The logic of intervention in Central Eastern Europe
Despite differing emphases, the actual justification given for involvement by each of these agencies with social policy in CEE countries follows a similar pattern. According to the COE: 'It is imperative to incorporate these countries into an effective system for the protection and promotion of fundamental social right … in order to prevent social upheavals which may be painful for the people and dangerous for their still vulnerable democracies' (Mros, 1993, p. 41) . The Centre for Cooperation with European Economics in Transition (CCEET) of the OECD in exploring its co-ordination with the ILO in its work programme states: 'in the absence of a quick and effective policy response to the emergence of major social and labour market problems at the beginning of the transition, there is a risk that the ongoing reform process may be impeded, delayed or some steps even reversed' (OECD, 1993, p. 271) . According to the Commission of the EU: 'Co-operation between the Union and the CEE countries on the social dimension of transition is essential to reduce the risk of the population rejecting democracy and the market economy because the social and human costs are too high' (European Commission, 1993, p. 70) . Concern to stabilise the process of market reform and prevent its slowing down, with appropriate attention to the social costs of transition, thus characterises the motivation for intervention by all three agencies. The interventions made by each of these agencies individually in the social sphere, will now be examined.
Council of Europe intervention
The essence of the Council's social policy, and therefore its potential for influence in CEE, can be located in its Social Charter. The Social Charter boasts a complex biannual system of inspection and is extensive in coverage. The effectiveness of the Charter relies almost entirely on the sensitivity of member countries to the monitoring procedures and the usually limited publicity associated with them. Moreover, complete adherence to the Social Charter is optional. COE members have only to contract to ten of the nineteen articles, of which five must be out of a specific seven.
The minimal requirements do at least oblige new countries to either have in place a system of social security or social assistance. Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics all signed intentions to ratify the Charter in 1993. Others are following suit. Influence as to which parts they should sign has been exerted by existing members informally and formally through various committees. Since ratification procedures take two years and monitoring a further four, it will be 1999 before reports are completed on the extent to which these new CEE states are considered to be in line with their chosen requirements of the Social Charter. The concern with the development of social policies which would support the transition to a market economy did not appear to be a fundamental or consistent consideration in the accession of the new CEE members to the Council of Europe. With regard to the four countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Ukraine) in our study which have acceded to the Council, only in the Hungarian case was the country's willingness to sign the Social Charter, and adapt social security and welfare legislation accordingly, noted favourably in support of the application. In neither the reports on the Bulgarian nor the Lithuanian requests for admission was there a mention of social legislation. Political pluralism and the rule of law, as well as respect for the convention on human rights which is compulsory on accession, were clearly of paramount importance. Although there was a broadly shared judgement that none of the countries had at this point made substantial headway in restructuring their pension systems or other social programmes, this did not prevent their accession.
The Council of Europe has also established specific instruments directed at helping the reform process in the countries of CEE. These fall mainly within the DEMOSTHENES programme, whose official objective is the securing of democracy in countries in transition. The method by which this goal is pursued in DEMOSTHENES is by making available the expertise of existing members through workshops, seminars, courses, study visits and scholarships. The focus is on the constitutional, legislative and administrative aspects of establishing Western style democracies and, it is assumed, market style economics with their accompanying social problems. Thus a small but significant part of the DEMOSTHENES programme (12.4 per cent) covers social affairs assistance sought by the CEE countries in dealing with Western style problems such as rising unemployment. The DEMOSTHENES programme is administered by the Directorate of Political Affairs, but draws upon the expertise of members of the Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs in the delivery of the programme. The latter have outlined their contribution as being:
(i) to provide information on standard setting and co-ordinating instruments on the Council of Europe; (ii) to give legal assistance of draft legislation; (iii) to draft model provisions to cover the branches of social protection as they appear in the Code on Social Security … to enable countries to draft their own legislation with reference to the model provisions.
The Council does not through this programme consider it part of its remit to make country-specific recommendations. Instead, it invites countries' ministers, or representation from other significant players, to training sessions where a range of Western European model welfare states are presented, seemingly to allow observers to mix and match.
The OECD intervention
The history of the OECD's involvement with CEE since 1989, mirrors, to a certain extent, the original official concerns of the OECD as it was when set up for the administration of Marshall Aid in 1949. The OECD's Centre for Co-operation with European Economies in Transition (CCEET) was founded in 1990 on US monies, apparently to secure an American foothold in the Western rush to influence policy development in the East. The importance attached to the work of the Centre is apparent in the appointment of Salvatore Zecchini, formerly of the IMF, to head the Centre, at the level of Deputy to the General Secretary of the OECD.
The Centre's main role has been to design and oversee annual work programmes, the content of which have a familiar ring: policy advice, technical assistance and training -putting the expertise of the Secretariat and member countries at the disposal of the countries engaged in economic reform. One of the four key themes in the General Work Programme is social problems related to restructuring. The decision of the Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education to collaborate with the ILO on the delivery of part of this programme is interesting and suggests that US influence might not permeate down to the actual policy analysis and advice tabled at conferences of the Centre. A joint ILO/OECD conference was held in 1993 on Labour Market and Social Policy Implications, introduced by Guy Standing of the ILO and Georg Fisher, then of the Directorate of Social Affairs, which concluded that more detailed work was needed on designing social protection schemes for the newly marketised economies. The timing of this collaboration with the ILO coincided with evidence of a move within the OECD, away from condoning the retrenchments made in several Western European welfare states on the grounds of economic efficiency (OECD, 1994) .
The bulk of the Centre's work has focused on the states that are most advanced in the reform process, defined by the Centre as partners in transition (PIT). A smaller section of the Centre's work has targeted the four largest of the new independent states of the Soviet Union (NIS) with a similar remit. The pattern of work established so far has been demand led from the PIT and NIS countries themselves. This form of organisation means that influence and direction remain rather ad hoc, the content of programmes being decided, in part, by the orientations of individual applicants. For instance, while requests from the Polish government came via the Ministry of Labour specifically for a labour market review, the Hungarians applied through their Ministry of Welfare for a Labour/Social Security and Social Assistance Review. Hence, in the Polish case, the detailed technical assistance work on the labour market does not cover social aspects in detail. In the Hungarian case, however, the detailed study of the social assistance and social protection schemes took place. This report, which was be the first detailed evaluation of the social policy of a country since the New Orientations (OECD, 1994) document, is of particular interest. It was critical of the underfunded, locally administered social assistance scheme, set up under a World Bank loan, and offered the country sensitive advice on how it might retain desirable parts of it's social protection system in the context of budget constraints.
The European Union intervention
The PHARE (Pologne/Hongrie: assistance à la restructuration économique), administered by DGI (External Relations Directorate), has been the major technical assistance programme whereby the EU has facilitated the economic transition of its neighbouring states. TACIS was developed later to undertake the same function for former Soviet Union countries. For PHARE this meant a focus on financial reconstruction and encouragement of the private sector, especially small and medium sized enterprises. However, one of the core areas specified for targeting was social. The specific EU priorities in the social sphere as expressed through the PHARE programme are hard to identify. Our attempts to pin down the policy advice implicit in PHARE assistance in the social security and social assistance sphere have confronted obstacles. In part this has been due to the subcontracting of advice to consultants and partly due to the rapidity of turnover of staff in Brussels and associated inconsistent record keeping, both contributing to a general lack of coherence. This situation has been mulled over by personnel in DGV (Social Affairs Directorate), who have argued that they would achieve a more directive and less fragmented input in the social policy sphere if the responsibility for part of the programme was delegated to them. They did attempt to establish a DGV European Social Security Team that would win DGI PHARE contracts and steer Eastern Europe towards a more consistent set of European social security policies. This initiative floundered on the rocks of UK resistance.
Inconsistencies which arise as a result of the differing perspectives of consultants is compounded by the tensions reflecting the battle within the EU as a whole, between the Euroliberals and the Eurocorporatists. An interesting difference is to be noted between the work in Poland on social assistance, where the EU contract was given to the World Bank who then subcontracted this to the British Council, and that done for the Czech Republic where the contract was won by the ILO, who contracted Tony Lynes, a highly regarded British expert on social assistance. In the case of the Baltic states, the desk officer at PHARE in Brussels felt it more appropriate to draw on best practice within Eastern Europe, and awarded a contract on social assistance to a Czech social security expert.
In this section we have reviewed the social policy of the three European based institutions seeking to influence CEE social policy in a variety of ways. We have described the extent of their involvement in the region and critically discussed the instruments used to effect change. A final assessment of this material is left until the conclusion of the article, after an examination of the work of the World Bank.
T H E W O R L D B A N K : S H I F T I N G D I S C O U R S E O F S O C I A L P O L I C Y
In this section we present our initial assessment of the technical advice and policy prescriptions offered by the Bank in the sphere of income maintenance for the countries in our sample. First, the instruments available to the Bank for influencing policy are described together with an account of the extent to which they have been used in the countries in this study. Second, the review of actual detailed policy prescriptions is presented. Third, the extent to which there is internal debate and controversy within the Bank over appropriate policy advice is analysed. Table 3 sets out some of the instruments available to the Bank for shaping policy and the extent to which they have been employed so far in the countries being studied. The Hungarian case represents the most complete story. The full cycle from an initial country economic assessment, through a social sector study with recommendations, and on to a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) tranched so that part of it was conditional upon the government introducing national social assistance legislation has been completed. The World Bank's Operation Evaluation Division (World Bank, 1993b) concluded that: 'The S.A.L. conditions were satisfied on time … A social safety net that provides unemployment benefits and social assistance is now in place, but much more needs to be done to rationalise social expenditure in general to target them to the needy' (World Bank, 1993b) .
Bank instruments and activity
From the Bank's point of view, the social conditionality of the Hungarian SAL was further evidence of its commitment to reduce poverty in the context of its global operations. Its own publication, 'Implementing the World Bank's Strategy to Reduce Poverty' (p. xi) notes that: 'The share of adjustment lending that addresses social issues climbed from 5% in Fiscal 1984 -86 to 50% in Fiscal 1990 -92. In Fiscal 1992 , eighteen out of thirty-two adjustment loans included an explicit poverty focus, and fourteen of these adjustment loans had trancherelease conditions' (World Bank, 1993b ).
Bank prescriptions
The work of the Bank in the other countries in our study has not progressed this far. At this stage, therefore, we are only able to examine the recommendations concerning social security and income maintenance in the initial country economic assessments. An analysis of this kind has been undertaken earlier for other countries by Milanovic (1992) . Reviewing the recommendations in the reports on five countries of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrghyzstan, Georgia and Lithuania), he concluded that there were several policy areas where a consensus appeared to exist in Bank policy, some areas where difference in recommendations could be explained by the different circumstances of countries, and some key areas where diverse recommendations reflected implicit or explicit disagreements between Bank officials or between the officials and the consultants employed. Consensus appeared to exist in four areas: Universal Safety Net: should there be such a strategy or not? (In the sample of countries examined by Milanovic the case for a universal safety net / minimum poverty line below which nobody should fall was put for Russia and Lithuania, not dealt with for Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan, and argued against for Georgia); Unemployment Benefits: should they be flat rate or wage related? Pension levels: should they be equal for all (a state flat rate minimum) or continue to be wage related (continuing to fulfil the implicit past insurance contract)? Family allowances: should they be income tested or universal? The argument against means testing rests for some bank personnel on the grounds of the continuing narrow range of income differentials, the absence of administrative infrastructure, and the close association of children with family poverty; Public Work (workfare): the concept of self-targeted public works programmes (as a substitute for means tested social assistance) is defended for some countries. Table 4 indicates the results of a comparable analysis for the four countries of this study concentrating upon the potential areas of disagreement noted above. This can only be a snapshot of policy recommendations at a particular moment in time. In terms of pension policy, while there are still differences of emphasis between reports that do not argue against wage related pensions and those that do, and between those that explicitly encourage private pensions and those that do not, there is a discernible drift towards a crisis-driven, short-term, flat-rate strategy. This was also noted by Vodopiver (1992, p. 8) , who continued the work of Milanovic for the Bank by reviewing more recent reports (Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine) and concluded that: 'all reports under current review also advocate flat-rate unemployment and pension benefit. The congruence seems to be a fruit of concerted action on the part of the Bank -powerful arguments against a flat-rate benefit reported in Milanovic' In fact, this issue of pensions is by no means settled in the Bank, a point returned to later below. In terms of family allowances, there is variable advice which partly presumably reflects actual differences in country policy and also differences in the inclinations of report authors and consultants. The general assault on generous, wage related, high replacement rate unemployment benefits continues. In terms of safety net policy, these reports reveal that beyond the common lip service to the concept of safety net the actual analysis and recommendations vary widely. Whereas the report for Hungary favoured a national means tested strategy (even though in the event a very locally variable social assistance law has been passed), the report for Bulgaria eschewed this idea in favour of categorial help (even though in the event a national means tested system has been introduced). However, for the less European countries of the former Soviet Union, there does seem to be an understanding now on the part of the Bank officials and consultants that continued partial food subsidy and universal entitlements to population categories known to be poor are preferable to unviable means tested strategies. This point is returned to later.
TA B L E 3. World Bank instruments for shaping social policy
The 'workfare' idea, mentioned in the earlier review by Milanovic, seems to have fallen out of favour as World Bank policy. This, interestingly, is a strategy that is now favoured by the IMF (Ahmed, 1993) and defended strongly by one of its leading advocates inside the Fund, on the grounds that means testing in partially monetised and fluid economics is nonviable and the dangers of discriminatory practice (such as prejudiced social workers disallowing access to benefit) cannot occur in a work-test system. In defence of the workfare strategy IMF officials also point to the need for the urgent implementation of social protection rescue strategies, while longer term, problematic, means tested administrative capacity is put in place.
Bank irresolution -pensions and safety nets in dispute
Before exploring the substantive content of the dispute about pensions and the lack of clarity about safety nets, it is necessary to offer some contextualisation in terms of the Banks anti-poverty strategy. The World Bank and, to lesser extent, the International Monetary Fund, had before the collapse of the state bureaucratic system in Eastern Europe responded to the earlier criticisms of its policy and practice in developing countries by adopting an anti-poverty strategy. The World Development Report 1990 focused on poverty. In 1991 the policy paper Assistance Strategies to Reduce Poverty was published. This was followed by the 1992 Poverty Reduction Hand-book. However, the events of 1989 overtook this initiative and in a development that had not been foreseen, led to a major focus of the Bank's work on poverty alleviation being the countries of the CIS and CEE. This meant that the Bank was having to deal with and make recommendations for developed industrial economies on the mainland of continental Europe. It was ill equipped to do this and thus needed to recruit a significant number of new officials and engage a new tranche of consultants more familiar with the income maintenance systems of developed economics and more sensitive to the social guarantees of the earlier regimes. The Human Resources Sector of the Europe and Central Asia Division of the Bank expanded rapidly.
Whereas the dominant tradition and practice in the Human Resources sectors of the Bank had been influenced by USA liberalism at home, and South American models of private welfare development abroad, combined with anti-poverty thinking appropriate to developing countries, the new influx of talent were engaged in a different discourse. Nicholas Barr, Sandor Sipos, Igor Tomes, John Micklewright, and many others brought an understanding of, and commitment to, the European tradition of wage related social security systems and a sensitivity to the guarantees of communism. It is within this context that it can be argued that it is not simply that the World Bank is an important actor in shaping post-communist social policy, but that the pre-existing social guarantees of communism have contributed to the reformulation of Bank social policy. Of course the factors leading to internal Bank dispute are more complex than this. Also shaping Bank thinking are the little miracles of South East Asia that have demonstrated the case for state infrastructural expenditure on education and health, thus denting the case of liberal fundamentalism.
If this is the context and background to the disagreements within the Bank, which are reflected in the variable recommendations about social policy for Central Eastern Europe and the CIS, where have the disputes now reached? Has the issue been settled, for example, on pensions? On pensions, the Bank was in the unusual position of seeing published, at the same time by staff and consultants, two differently oriented texts. One of these, a World Bank Policy Research Report on pensions produced under a team lead by Estelle James (World Bank, 1995) , is based partly on a paper by Louise Fox entitled 'Old Age Security in Transition Economies'. Louise Fox was the author of the Bulgarian social security chapter (World Bank, 1993c) , within which she had encouraged the development of a private pension scheme and avoided arguing for a national social assistance scheme. The views expressed by Fox and James can be summed up as a reduction of the public pension provision to, either a subsistence contributory flat rate, or, means tested flat rate system, funded by pay-role tax or general revenue. In addition, a compulsory private pillar is proposed, disconnected from the occupational system. Nicholas Barr, on the other hand, in his chapter on social insurance (Barr, 1995) in a different World Bank volume, sets out a set of policy options much more in keeping with existing practice in mainstream European systems. The common ground is the need to raise pension age and the protection of minimum benefits. The differences are in the scope for state wage related pensions and their private alternatives. Barr argues that social insurance contributions should be shared between worker and employer and the relationship between benefits and contributions strengthened. Private pensions should not be introduced until the necessary regulatory structure has been put in place. Beyond this, he argues, policy makers have a choice about the form of public/private mix in pensions. A mainstream Western European system would have three tiers and would be very much a partnership between the public and private sectors. The foundation PAYG social insurance pension would have a wider role than mere subsistence and involve only appropriate maxima for contributions and benefits. In addition, there would be mandatory regulated private pensions and voluntary additional schemes.
Within the Human Resources section of the relevant country divisions, the issue is not settled. An internal meeting (November 1993), while perceived by the Europeans to conclude in their favour was also perceived by the supporters of the flat rate public pillar as laying the framework for further work, demonstrating the relevance of that strategy. The report of the meeting concluded that one strategy may be to select a couple of representative countries on which to focus the region's energies and resources for pension reform (World Bank, 1993c) . Subsequently, an internal conference was convened to take a rain-check on policy advice in this area (and that of social assistance). The convenor was strongly of the opinion that it would be unwise to lock Eastern Europe into the costly mistakes of Western European social security commitments and sees, instead, the opportunity for institutional leapfrogging whereby Eastern Europe might fashion schemes more appropriate to post-Fordist flexible production. He has in mind only minimum means and asset tested state pensions. The policy debate is being unfolded partly through case examples (e.g., Lithuania), so that choice of Bank staff and consultants is important. It is also being unfolded through the choice of consultants and staff members to write particular reports. Barr, for example, was commisioned to write the social security sector of the 1996 World Bank report, which is on Economies in Transition. Many of the sentiments expressed in Barr (1995) are, therefore, likely to find reflection in this imminent publication (World Bank, 1996) . (Deacon, 1994) , we have described, both at the level of broad social policy orientation, and at the more detailed level of income maintenance policy, the prescriptions being offered to a sample of four Central Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries by six international organisations; the ILO, the IMF, the EU, the OECD, the COE and the World Bank. We are convinced that the discourse on desirable social policy, taking place within and between agencies, provides a policy choice backcloth against which, and in reference to which, national governments are making policy. Equally, we are convinced that policy making in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union is being used as a testing ground for ideas about the future of social policy elsewhere. The advice flowing from the EU to the East is not systematically European, conservative corporatist. DGV does not control DGI. Social policy thinking in the OECD seems divided between American liberalism and some form of greater commitment to welfare expenditure. Within both the Council of Europe and the ILO, individual actors are seeking to win commitment to a citizenship entitlement approach to income maintenance, where others continue to have faith in Bismarkian insurance strategies originating in earlier economic conditions. Within the World Bank, a European camp, committed to a greater degree of social solidarity, continues to do battle with an American camp, which prefers individualism with a safety net. The IMF, while continuing to cut expenditure, is attempting to demonstrate a commitment to welfare via a self-targeted workfare strategy.
We conclude that it is possible to identify the broad sweep of social policy prescriptions emanating from the agencies with either one of the already existing worlds of welfare capitalism (Esping-Anderson, 1990) , or with one of the emerging Post-Fordist worlds of welfare (Burrows and Loader, 1994) . We characterised these emerging worlds as either social liberalism, that is, liberalism with a safety net, or futuristic, within which a citizenship income approach is a key element. Table 5 below summarises the emerging global discourse, and the extent to which camps within each agency can be identified with different positions. In Deacon (1997 forthcoming) the analysis behind this conclusion is elaborated at greater length. 
TA B L E 5. Global social policy discourse

